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I. INTRODUCTION 
"Clearly, one person's trash is another's treasure."\ Although "e-




The opinions expressed herein are solely those of the authors and not necessarily of 
the organizations mentioned. 
Maria Perez Crist, Preserving the Duty to Preserve: The Increasing Vulnerability of 
Electronic In/ormation, 58 S.C. L. REv. 7, 9 (2006); accord United Med. Supply Co. 
v. United States, 77 Fed. Cl. 257, 258 (2007). 
Problems associated with the preservation of electronic materials are not new. 
Professor Marcus has noted: "Preservation of discoverable material has always been 
a serious concern. Since Rose Mary Woods became famous [in 1973] due to her 
reported role in creating an 18 minute gap on a Watergate tape, the risks that 
2008) Pre-Litigation Preservation Decisions 383 
may also be the forward edge of a di¥ital litigation revolution that 
will result in a more efficient process. The Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure (Federal Rules or Rules) and common-law principles, 
combined with electronic information, present creative litigators with 
tools and opportunities to solve litigation problems presented by the 
technological revolution, and establish a framework for the just, 
speedy, and inexpensive resolution of disputes.4 Nevertheless, 
adapting to change is not problem-free. It requires new approaches to 
dynamic issues: "It was neither a comet nor a dramatic climactic 
change that killed off the dinosaurs. They perished because they 
could not adapt to the digital age. "S 
The Rules Enabling Act6 imposes limitations on the scope of the 
Federal Rules, creating a gap between the protections the Rules 
provide to litigants, and the protections afforded certain litigation-
related actions that often must take place before litigation is 
instituted. Because the duty to preserve electronically stored 
information (ESI) may arise before a lawsuit is filed, decisions 
regarding the scope of that preservation duty may have to be made in 
the absence of a clear standard providing practicable guidance 
regarding what a court subsequently would require to be preserved, 
simply because the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which regulate 
the discovery process, are applicable only to pending lawsuits.7 
technologically stored information might be lost have been clear." Richard L. 
Marcus, E-Discovery & Beyond: Toward Brave New World or 1984?, 25 REv. LITIG. 
633 (2006), reprinted in 236 F.R.D. 598, 614 (2006). In fact: 
[T]he process of adapting to discovery of electronically stored 
information has gone on for a generation. More than thirty-five 
years ago, Rule 34 was amended in expectation that discovery of 
this material would become important. More than twenty-five 
years ago, major decisions on how to handle discovery of this 
material began to occur. 
Jd. at 618. 
3. Marcus, supra note 2, at 603. Another writer has noted that: "E-discovery presents 
marvelous opportunities to minimize the cost and disruption of traditional forms of 
discovery." Steven C. Bennett, Electronic Materials and Other Discovery 
Considerations, in INSURANCE COVERAGE 2006: CLAIM TRENDS AND LITIGA nON Ill, 
117-18 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice, Course Handbook Series No. 8412, 2006), 
WL 742 PLIILit Ill. 
4. See FED. R. Crv. P. 1. 
5. Martin A. Redish, Electronic Discovery and the Litigation Matrix, 51 DUKE L.J. 561, 
563 (2001) (quoting Jerold S. Solovy & Robert L. Byman, Digital Discovery, NAT'L 
L.J., Dec. 27, 1999, at AI6). 
6. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2000). 
7. See. e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 26(d), (t); see infra Part IV. 
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While Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 1 calls for the interpretation of 
the rules of procedure to achieve the just, speedy, and inexpensive 
resolution of disputes,8 the inapplicability of the Rules to pretrial 
activity of the party that bears the obligation to preserve suggests that 
prudent counsel and cautious litigants may feel compelled to expend 
enormous sums to preserve ESI that need not be preserved, will never 
be produced in discovery,9 and that may greatly exceed the economic 
value of the claims presented. 
This article suggests a mechanism for narrowing the gap between 
protections the Federal Rules provide to litigants, and the current 
state of uncertainty regarding the scope of the pretrial duty to 
preserve ESI that currently plagues potential litigants before litigation 
is instituted. lo It proposes that both procedural and conflict-of-Iaw 
issues are best resolved by applying by analogy the protections of 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 26(b)(2)(C) and 37(e) (or 
comparable state-law provisions) to guide preservation efforts before 
a lawsuit is commenced. II 
A. Source of the Duty to Preserve 
The duty to preserve relevant information may arise from the 
common-law duty to avoid spoliation of discoverable information, or 
by statute, regulation, agreement, or court order. 12 In instances that 
are not pertinent here, it may also arise from criminallaw. 13 
8. "[The Rules] should be construed and administered to secure the just, speedy, and 
inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding." FED R. eN. P. 1. 
9. This article does not address the duty to produce ESI. 
[I]t does not follow from a duty to preserve that the preserved 
information is automatically subject to production without regard 
to issues of burden and relevance. All that preservation does is to 
ensure that a judge will be able to make that determination at a 
time when it can be put into effect if the justification for 
production seems sufficient. 
Richard Marcus, Only Yesterday: Reflections on Rulemaking Responses to E-
discovery, 73 FORDHAM L. REv. 1, 14 (2004). 
10. See id. at 17. 
11. See infra Part V. 
12. See infra Part II. 
13. See. e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 215.40 (McKinney 1998). The statute provides: 
A person is guilty of tampering with physical evidence when: 
1. With intent that it be used or introduced in an official 
proceeding or a prospective official proceeding, he (a) knowingly 
makes, devises or prepares false physical evidence, or (b) 
produces or offers such evidence at such a proceeding knowing it 
to be false; or 
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B. Scope of the Duty to Preserve 
"Perhaps the most vexing issues in electronic discovery, and the 
issues that grab the most headlines, are the issue of data preservation 
and its flip side, spoliation.,,14 This article suggests that the pre-
litigation common-law duty to preserve, especially in the context of 
ESI, should be guided by the same factors that limit the scope of 
discovery and sanctions that may be imposed by the court in 
litigation. IS Specifically, although the duty to preserve often arises 
before litigation is commenced, the cost-benefit factors in Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b )(2)(C) do not directly apply before a 
complaint is filed. 16 Because the scope of the duty to preserve is 
defined by the sc~e of discovery, and because the duty to preserve is 
neither absolute, I nor intended to cripple organizations,18 the Rules-
based limitations on the scope of discovery should provide analogous 
limits on the scope of the pre-litigation duty to preserve. 
Id. 
2. Believing that certain physical evidence is about to be 
produced or used in an official proceeding or a prospective 
official proceeding, and intending to prevent such production or 
use, he suppresses it by any act of concealment, alteration or 
destruction, or by employing force, intimidation or deception 
against any person. 
Tampering with physical evidence is a class E felony. 
14. Kenneth J. Withers, Electronically Stored Information: The December 2006 
Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 4 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. 
PROP. 171, 188 (2006). 
IS. See infra Part V. 
16. See, e.g., Withers, supra note 14, at 177-78; see infra Part IV. 
17. Daniel Renwick Hodgman, Comment, A Port in the Storm?: The Problematic and 
Shallow Safe Harbor for Electronic Discovery, 10 Nw. U. L. REV. 259, 268 n.60 
(2007); see Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake IV), 220 F.R.D. 212, 217 
(S.D.N.Y. 2003); see also THE SEDONA CONFERENCE WORKING GROUP ON 
ELECTRONIC DOCUMENT RETENTION & PRODUCTION, THE SEDONA CONFERENCE 
COMMENTARY ON LEGAL HOLDS: THE TRIGGER AND THE PROCESS 2 n.8 (drft. ed. 
2007), available at http://www.thesedonaconference.orgicontentlmiscFiles/ 
Legal_holds.pdf [hereinafter LEGAL HOLDS] (stating that "it is 'unreasonable to 
expect parties to take every conceivable step to preserve potentially relevant data'" 
(quoting THE SEDONA CONFERENCE, THE SEDONA PRINCIPLES: BEST PRACTICES, 
RECOMMENDATIONS & PRINCIPLES FOR ADDRESSING ELECTRONIC DOCUMENT 
PRODUCTION ii, princ. 5 (2d ed. 2007), available at 
http://www.thesedonaconference.orgicontentimiscFiles/TSC _ PRINCP _2nd _ ed _ 607. 
pdf). 
18. See Zubulake IV, 220 F.R.D. at 217. 
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C. When Courts Evaluate Pre-Litigation Conduct Using Their 
Inherent Powers, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Do Not 
Directly Apply to That Conduct 
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not directly apply to 
actions that occur before a lawsuit is commenced. 19 Nevertheless, 
courts are often rcresented with sanctions motions based on pre-
litigation conduct. 0 
Courts may sanction parties for failure to preserve potentially 
responsive information
i 
even if that failure to preserve pre-dates the 
filing of the complaint. I The court's inherent power is the source of 
the power to sanction violations of the pre-litigation duty.22 In short, 
if a litigant breaches a common-law preservation duty before a 
lawsuit is commenced, and therefore before the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure are applicable, the Federal Rules are not the source 
of a trial court's power to punish that litigant for acts that occurred 
before the court obtained jurisdiction. 
D. Practical Ramifications of the Preservation Dilemma 
Although at first blush it may seem that this issue is nothing more 
than an academic distinction, it has enormous practical significance 
for litigants. For example, assume an organization-whether 
governmental or private-recognizes the occurrence of an event that 
triggers the substantive duty to preserve ESI, but no lawsuit has been 
filed. Assume further that reasonable minds could differ about just 
what should be preserved. It may be that there is no known attorney 
for a potential plaintiff who could be contacted with an eye toward 
reaching an agreement about what should be preserved; or it may be 
that an attorney is known, but he or she demands more expansive and 
expensive preservation than the organization feels is called for. 
Assume further that the cost of "preserving everything," even from 
sources that are not readily accessible because of undue burden or 
cost,23 greatly exceeds the realistic evaluation of the economic value 
of the case. What should the organization do? Must it preserve 
everything, regardless of cost or degree of relevancy, or may it make 
good-faith decisions regarding what it believes is reasonable under 
the circumstances, even if this means that some ESI that may fit 
19. See infra Part IV. 
20. See, e.g., Silvestri v. GMC, 271 F.3d 583, 591 (4th Cir. 2001); Zubulake lV, 220 
F.R.D. at 216. 
21. See, e.g., Zubulake IV, 220 F .R.D. at 216. 
22. ld. 
23. FED. R. CIV. P. 26. 
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within the low threshold of potentially relevant information may be 
lost or destroyed? Further, assuming the organization does make a 
decision to preserve less than all potentially relevant ESI, because the 
cost of preserving all ESI would be unreasonable given the potential 
value of the claim that foreseeably could be brought, or because its 
relevance is marginal or it is viewed as duplicative, what would be 
the consequences to it if litigation is brought, and the court ultimately 
determines that the organization failed to preserve unique ESI that 
was relevant, indeed essential, to the plaintiff's case? May the 
organization be sanctioned for its pre-litigation failure to preserve 
and, if so, what sanctions could the court impose? 
E. Proposed Solution 
In light of the significant sanctions that courts may impose because 
of a pre-litigation failure to preserve ESI,24 the contours of limitations 
on the pre-litigation duty to preserve need to be clear and capable of 
being articulated by counsel to clients, so that informed judgments 
may be made and presented to the reviewing courts with detailed 
support and analysis, guided by a body of developing case law. 
Furthermore, those limitations should parallel the Federal Rules that 
will apply after litigation is commenced. 
It is suggested that application by analogy of the protections 
afforded in Rules 26(b)(2)(C) and 37(e) is the mechanism to provide 
those contours. In the ESI context, the cost-benefit protections of 
Rule 26(b)(2)(C) and Rule 37(e)'s "safe harbor,,25 should apply by 
analogy to define pre-litigation preservation conduct that is not 
directly governed by those Rules.26 It would, for example, be 
anomalous to conclude that a good-faith failure to preserve 
information after a lawsuit is commenced should be afforded greater 
protection than an identical failure before suit is filed simply because 
24. See infra Part V. 
25. In brief summary, Rule 37(e) provides that a litigant may not be sanctioned under the 
Rules when ESI is lost due to the good faith, routine operation of an information 
technology system. FED. R. CIY. P. 37(e); see also infra Part IV. An amendment, 
effective Dec. I, 2007, restyled the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and relocated 
Rule 37(t) to 37(e), and Rule 37(g) to 37(f). See FED. R. CIY. P. 37 advisory 
committee's note to 2007 amendments. Thus, any reference in the main text of this 
article to the advisory committee's note to Rule 37(e) refers back the advisory 
committee's note to Rule 37(f). See infra notes 37, 51. 
26. See E.E.O.C. v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 690 F. Supp. 995, 997 (M.D. Fla. 
1988); see also Thomas Y. Allman, Rule 37(f) Meets its Critics: The Justificationfor 
a Limited Preservation Safe Harbor for ESi, 5 Nw. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 1 
(2006), http://www.law.northwestem.edu/journals/njtip/v5/nl/l/. 
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the Rule 37(e) "safe harbor" cannot apply prior to litigation. It would 
be equally anomalous to sanction a party because it failed to preserve 
information that, under Rule 26(b )(2)(C), is later determined by the 
court not to be discoverable. 
II. SOURCE OF THE DUTY TO PRESERVE AND ITS CHOICE-
OF-LAW IMPLICATIONS 
Absent some countervailing factor, there is no general duty to 
preserve documents, things, or information, whether electronically 
stored or otherwise.27 "The duty to preserve electronic data can arise 
27. Clark v. City of Chi., No. 97 C 4820,2000 WL 875422, at *12 (N.D. Ill. June 28, 
2000); Commercial Bank v. Breedlove (In re Breedlove), No. 04-11096-R, 2007 WL 
2034143 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. July 9, 2007) ("Moreover, unless a duty othetwise 
exists, a party has no duty to preserve evidence unless and until 'he knows or should 
know [that the evidence] is relevant to imminent or ongoing litigation. ", (quoting 
United States v. Krause (In re Krause), 367 B.R. 740, 764 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2007) 
(alteration in original)); Boyd v. Travelers Ins. Co., 652 N.E.2d 267,270 (Ill. 1995) 
("The general rule is that there is no duty to preserve evidence."); see Glotzbach v. 
Froman, 854 N.E.2d 337, 340 n.1 (Ind. 2006) (applying Illinois law); PAUL R. RICE, 
ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE: LAW AND PRACTICE 52 (ABA 2005) ("In the absence of 
pending, or reasonably foreseeable, litigation, a party's good faith discarding of 
evidence pursuant to a normal practice is not sanctionable."); MICHAEL C. S. LANGE 
& KRISTIN M. NIMSGER, ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE AND DISCOVERY: WHAT EVERY 
LAWYER SHOULD KNow 54 (ABA 2004) (stating that, if there is no statutory or 
regulatory duty to maintain information, the retention test is one of 
"reasonableness"); Roland C. Goss, Hot Issues in Electronic Discovery: Information 
Retention Programs and Preservation, 42 TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAC. L.J. 797, 819 
(2007) ("Normally, there is no obligation to preserve documents that are unrelated to 
the litigation or the parties involved, and are routinely deleted."). 
This is not to say that all documents may be destroyed, even when litigation is not 
reasonably anticipated, because not every document management policy is valid. 
Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696, 704 (2005); Lewy v. 
Remington Arms Co., 836 F.2d 1104, 1112 (8th Cir. 1988) (holding that document 
retention policy must be reasonable; a gun manufacturer "cannot blindly destroy 
documents" and still be protected "by a seemingly innocuous document retention 
policy"); Broccoli v. Echostar Commc'ns Corp., 229 F.R.D. 506, 510 (D. Md. 2005) 
(permitting sanctions against corporate defendant whose record destruction policy 
was unreasonable). For a deSCription of an improper document destruction scenario, 
see In re Napster Inc. Copyright Litig., 462 F. Supp. 2d 1060, 1073 (N.D. Cal. 2006) 
("Indeed, Hummer's representations regarding its document retention policy are 
muddled and inconsistent, and do not suggest an organized effort to maintain 
Napster-related communications as required."). 
Nevertheless, in one study, the researchers "did not discover a single case where a 
court sanctioned a party solely for following its document retention and recycling 
policy; there was always another consideration." Shira A. Scheindlin & Kanchana 
Wangkeo, Electronic Discovery Sanctions in the Twenty-First Century, 11 MICH. 
TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REv. 71, 94 (2004), available at http://www.mttlr.org/ 
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from a wide variety of sources.,,28 It may arise from statutes,29 
regulations,3o ethical rules,3l court orders,32 or the common law?3 A 
duty to preserve may also arise through an agreement, a contract, or 
another special circumstance.34 State or federal criminal law mals 
also define a duty to preserve, within constitutional constraints. 5 
"As noted in the September 2005 Report of the Standing Committee 
of the Judicial Conference recommending adoption of the 2006 
Amendments, preservation obligations 'arise from independent 
sources of law' and are dependent upon 'the substantive law of each 
volelevenlscheindlin.pdf; accord Stevenson v. Union Pac. R.R., 354 F.3d 739, 747 
(8th Cir. 2004). 
28. Dale M. Cendali et aI., Potential Ethical Pitfalls in Electronic Discovery, in ETHICS 
IN CONTEXT 2007: ETHICS AND ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY III, 113 (PU N.Y. Practice 
Skills, Course Handbook No. 10960, 2007), WL 171 PLIINY 105. 
29. Id. (citing 15 U.S.c. § 78u-4(b)(3)(C)(i) (2006)). Sarbanes-Oxley is another 
important statutory source of a duty to preserve. /d. at 113. No effort is made in this 
article to exhaustively list statutory or regulatory sources of a duty to preserve 
information. 
30. "[T]he rules of both the National Association of Securities Dealers and the Securities 
and Exchange Commission require the preservation for three years of instant 
messages involving securities trading activities." Goss, supra note 27, at 821. 
31. Cendali et aI., supra note 28, at 113 ("According to ABA Model Rule of Professional 
Conduct 3.4, which governs fairness to the opposing party and counsel, 'a lawyer 
shall not unlawfully obstruct another party's access to evidence or unlawfully alter, 
destroy or conceal a document or other material having potential evidentiary 
value."'). 
32. Id. at 114 (citing Antioch Co. v. Scrapbook Borders, Inc., 210 F.R.D. 645, 651-52 
(D. Minn. 2002) (issuing a preservation order to guard against the loss of data)). 
33. Id. (citing Zubulake IV. 220 F.R.D. 212, 218 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)); LEGAL HOLDS, supra 
note 17, at 1 ("The duty to preserve typically arises from the common law duty to 
avoid spoliation of relevant evidence for use at trial; the inherent power of the courts; 
and court rules governing the imposition of sanctions."). 
34. Boyd v. Travelers Ins. Co., 652 N.E.2d 267,271 (III. 1995) ("[A] duty to preserve 
evidence may arise through an agreement, a contract, a statute or another special 
circumstance. Moreover, a defendant may voluntarily assume a duty by affirmative 
conduct." (citations omitted)). A preservation letter is not a necessary predicate to 
triggering the duty. Thompson v. U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., 219 F.R.D. 93, 
100 (D. Md. 2003). Further, a preservation letter that is watered down as a 
settlement proposal may not trigger the duty. Cache La Poudre Feeds, LLC v. Land 
O'Lakes, Inc., 244 F.R.D. 614, 623 (D. Colo. 2007). 
35. This article is limited to the duty to preserve in connection with civil claims and 
actions. The prosecution's duty to preserve evidence in criminal cases involves 
different principles. See, e.g., California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 488-89 (1984). 
Similarly, a target's duty may involve different principles. E.g., Arthur Andersen 
LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696 (2005). 
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jurisdiction.',,36 The duty was not created by the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure or the Federal Rules of Evidence.37 
Regardless of its source, the existence of the duty is well-
established.38 In some instances, the duty to preserve is governed by 
state law; in others, by federal law. 
36. Thomas Y. Allman, Managing Preservation Obligations After the 2006 Federal E-
Discovery Amendments, 13 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 9, ~ 1 (2007), 
http://law.richmond.edu/jolt!vI3i3/artic1e9.pdf (quoting REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL 
CONFERENCE COMMIITEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE Rules-Pages 32, 34 
(2005), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/ruleslReports/ST09-2005.pdf 
[hereinafter JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMMIITEE]). 
37. See FED. R. CIv. P. 37(e) and accompanying advisory committee's note to the 2006 
amendments. See supra note 25. 
38. See, e.g., Crist, supra note 1, at 13 n.24. Professor Crist noted that: 
Jd 
All circuits recognize the duty to preserve information relevant 
to anticipated or existing litigation. See Vazquez-Corales v. Sea-
Land Serv., Inc., 172 F.RD. 10, 11 (D.P.R. 1997) (citing Baliotis 
v. McNeil, 870 F. Supp. 1285, 1290 (M.D. Pa. 1994); Allstate Ins. 
Co. v. Creative Env't Corp., 28 Fed. R. Servo 3d (West) 1352, 
1358 (D.R.I 1994)); Fujitsu Ltd. v. Fed. Express Corp., 247 F.3d 
423, 436 (2d Cir. 2001) (citing Kronisch v. United States, 150 
F.3d 112, 126 (2d Cir. 1998)); In re Wechsler, 121 F. Supp. 2d 
404,415 (D. Del. 2000); Silvestri v. Gen. Motors Corp., 271 F.3d 
583, 591 (4th Cir. 2001) (citing Kronisch, 150 F.3d at 126); 
Williams v. Briggs Co., 62 F.3d 703, 708 (5th Cir. 1995); Beil v. 
Lakewood Eng'g & Mfg. Co., 15 F.3d 546, 552 (6th Cir. 1994) 
(citing Taylor v. Medtronics, Inc., 861 F.2d 980, 985 (6th Cir. 
1988)); Cooper v. United Vaccines, Inc., 117 F. Supp. 2d 864, 
874 (E.D. Wis. 2000) (citing Sentry Ins. v. Royal Ins. Co. of Am., 
539 N.W.2d 911, 916 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995)); Concord Boat Corp. 
v. Brunswick Corp., No LR-C-95-781, 1997 WL 33352759, at *4 
(E.D. Ark. Aug. 29, 1997) (citing Turner v. Hudson Transit Lines, 
Inc., 142 F.RD. 68, 72 (S.D.N.Y. 1991)); Nat'! Ass'n of 
Radiation Survivors v. Turnage, 115 F.RD. 543, 556-57 (N.D. 
Cal. 1987) (quoting Wm. T. Thompson Co. v. Gen. Nutrition 
Corp., 593 F. Supp. 1443, 1455 (C.D. Cal. 1984)); Procter & 
Gamble Co. v. Haugen, 179 F.R.D. 622, 631 (D. Utah 1998), 
rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Proctor & Gamble Co. v. 
Haugen, 222 F.3d 1262 (10th Cir. 2000) (citing Gen. Nutrition, 
593 F. Supp. at 1455); Fla. Evergreen Foliage v. E.!. DuPont De 
Nemours & Co., 336 F. Supp. 2d 1239, 1272 (S.D. Fla. 2004) 
(citing Green Leaf Nursery v. E.!. DuPont De Nemours & Co., 
341 F.3d 1292, 1308-09 (11th Cir. 2003)); Holmes v. Amerex 
Rent-A-Car, 180 F.3d 294, 296 (D.C. Cir. 1999). 
Several Maryland sanction decisions implicate that duty. See, e.g., Weaver v. 
ZeniMax Media, Inc., 174 Md. App. 16,43,923 A.2d 1032, 1048 (2007) (noting that 
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In Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake I), for example, the 
plaintiff asserted federal and state claims;39 however, the court had no 
need to specify the fundamental source of the duty to preserve ESI.40 
In state courts, and in federal courts exercising diversity jurisdiction, 
the rule aJwears to be that state law governs the pre-litigation duty to 
preserve, 1 while federal rules govern the procedure of a case after it 
is commenced in federal court.42 Where a federal court exercises 
federal subject-matter jurisdiction, however, the duty to preserve 
appears to be governed entirely by federallaw.43 For example, where 
federal regulations apply, they may define the duty.44 
The impact of the conflict-of-Iaws issue on a pre-litigation 
assessment of both the source and scope of the duty to preserve 
illustrates the need for clear guidance to litigants attempting to 
spoliation occurs when the filing of a suit is fairly imminent and evidence is 
intentionally destroyed). 
39. Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake I). 217 F.R.D. 309, 311 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
40. Id. at 316-17. 
41. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Broan Mfg. Co., No. CV-06-889-PHX-SMM, 2007 
WL 3390882, at * I (D. Ariz. Nov. 13, 2007); Lawrence v. Harley-Davidson Motor 
Co., No. 99 C 2609,1999 WL 637172, at *2 (N.D. III. Aug. 12,1999); Thomas v. 
Bombadier-Rotax Motorenfabrik, GmbH, 869 F. Supp. 551, 553-54 (N.D. III. 1994); 
State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Frigidaire, 146 F.R.D. 160, 163 (N.D. III. 1992) 
(applying Erie doctrine); see Allstate Ins. Co. v. Sunbeam Corp., 53 F.3d 804, 806 
(7th Cir. 1995) (recognizing a state duty of preservation by agreement of parties); 
Ward v. Tex. Steak Ltd., No. Civ.7:03 CV 00596, 2004 WL 1280776, at *2 (W.D. 
Va. May 27, 2004); JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMMITTEE supra note 36, at Rules-Page 
34 (recommending adoption of the 2006 amendments and stating that preservation 
obligations are dependent upon "the substantive law of each jurisdiction" (emphasis 
added»; contra St. Cyr v. Flying J, Inc., No. 3:06-cv-13-33TEM, 2007 WL 
1716365, at *3 (M.D. Fla. June 12,2007). 
42. See. e.g., Thomas, 669 F. Supp. at 553 (citing Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 465 
(1965». 
43. Doctor John's, Inc. v. City of Sioux City, 486 F. Supp. 2d 953,954 (N.D. Iowa 2007) 
("Indeed, both state and federal law require just the opposite, retention of evidence 
potentially relevant to pending or reasonably anticipated litigation."); Floeter v. City 
of Orlando, No. 6:05-cv-400-0rl-22KRS, 2007 WL 486633 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 9, 2007) 
(applying federal law in lawsuit asserting Title VII and state claims, but using Florida 
law for guidance); see also Qualcomm Inc. v. Broadcom Corp., No. 05cv1958-B 
(BLM), 2007 WL 2900537, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 28, 2007) ("Initially, the Court 
finds that federal common law governs the privilege issues in the instant dispute 
because the underlying case involves federal questions of law, specifically patent 
law."), enforced, 2008 WL 66932 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 7,2008), vacated and remanded in 
part, No. 05CV1958-RMB (BLM), 2008 WL 638108 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 5, 2008); 
LEGAL HOLDS, supra note 17, at 1 (referring to a "federal common law of 
spoliation"). 
44. Estate of LeMay v. Eli Lily & Co., 960 F. Supp. 183, 186 (E.D. Wis. 1997). 
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preserve ESI prior to litigation. Consider a hypothetical Maryland 
corporation with ESI physically located on servers and workstations 
in Maryland and Delaware. Assume that the corporation receives a 
notice of a lawsuit presenting state and federal claims from a Virginia 
plaintiff5 regarding a series of events, meetings, or transactions that 
occurred in the District of Columbia, Virginia, and Maryland, and via 
email to locations in Colorado and Georgia, with a possible filing in 
federal or state court in any of three fora. The corporation's duty to 
preserve may arise under the laws of the various states, under federal 
law, or both. Unless there are clear and universal proportionality 
guidelines applicable to the pre-litigation duty to preserve, the 
potential defendant must be prepared to comply with the duty to 
preserve as it may be defined in at least three federal circuits, four 
federal districts, and four state courts. If a federal forum is selected, 
absent uniformity, a federal court hearing federal and supplemental 
state claims could reach differing results regarding a breach of the 
pre-litigation duty to preserve.46 In short, because the pre-litigation 
duty to preserve does not spring from the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure or the Federal Rules of Evidence, it cannot be directly 
limited by those rules. Absent a meaningful and uniform ability to 
predict the scope of the duty to preserve based on the kind of cost-
benefit analysis articulated in the Federal Rules, a preserving litigant 
may be unfairly exposed to excessive costs or, alternatively, a motion 
for the imposition of sanctions, even if the entity acted in good faith. 
III. SCOPE OF THE DUTY TO PRESERVE47 
In Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake IV),48 the court noted: 
"The broad contours of the duty to preserve are relatively clear.'.49 
On a more detailed level, however, Judge Scheindlin, the author of 
45. In Zubulake I, for example, Ms. Zubulake asserted both federal and state claims 
against UBS Warburg LLC. 217 F.R.D. 309, 311 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
46. Spoliation, as opposed to breach of the duty to preserve, has been held to be a matter 
of the substantive federal law of evidence. See, e.g., State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. 
Broan Mfg. Co., 2007 WL 3390882, at *1 (finding that state law governed the duty to 
preserve; however, federal law governed sanctions for the breach); St. Cyr, 2007 WL 
1716365, at *3; Nichols v. Steelcase, Inc., No. Civ.A. 2:04-0434, 2005 WL 1862422, 
at *8 (D. W.Va. Aug. 4, 2005). 
47. This article does not specifically address the scope of the duty to preserve 
communications with experts who will be called to testify as witnesses at trial. See, 
e.g., Univ. of Pittsburgh v. Townsend, Nov. 3:04-cv-291, 2007 WL 1002317, at *4 
(E.D. Tenn. Mar. 30, 2007) (finding that e-mails between counsel and expert were 
discoverable). 
48. 220 F.R.D. 212 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
49. Id.at217. 
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the Zubulake opinions, has noted: "The obligation to preserve 
relevant evidence cannot be defined with precision. ,,50 Just as they 
did not create the duty to preserve, the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure do not define the scope of the pre-litigation duty to 
preserve.SI The preservation of ESI presents special concerns, 
50. SHIRA A. SCHElNDLlN, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE E-DISCOVERY: THE NEWLY 
AMENDED FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 7 n.28 (2006); accord GEORGE L. 
PAUL & BRUCE A. NEARON, THE DISCOVERY REVOLUTION: E-DISCOVERY 
AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 35 (ABA 2006) ("While 
it is fairly simple to articulate a party's duty to preserve electronic evidence 
generally, it is substantially more complicated to outline the scope of that duty."); 
LEGAL HOLDS, supra note 17, at 2 ("The basic principle that an organization has a 
duty to preserve relevant information in anticipation of litigation is easy to articulate. 
However, the precise application of that duty can be elusive."). 
While there is general agreement that the duty to preserve is only a "reasonable" 
duty, see discussion infra Part III, there is not unanimity in describing what the 
reasonable limits to the scope of the duty to preserve are. For example, in 2001, one 
commentator noted: 
Simply turning on a personal computer might destroy some such 
data, so one could insist that once litigation commences, or when 
the prospect appears on the horizon, no personal computer of a 
party or potential party should be turned on. That sort of 
overbroad preservation idea suggests the magnitude of the new 
spoliation concern. 
Richard L. Marcus, Confronting the Future: Coping with Discovery of Electronic 
Material, 64 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 253, 268 (2001) (footnote omitted). One year 
later, a federal district court noted its concern that routine use of a personal computer 
might result in the loss of relevant information and ordered preservation of the 
computer. Antioch Co. v. Scrapbook Borders, Inc., 210 F.R.D. 645 (2002). The 
court wrote: 
Accordingly, we conclude that the Defendants may have relevant 
information, on their computer equipment, which is being lost 
through normal use of the computer, and which might be relevant 
to the Plaintiffs claims, or the Defendants' defenses. This 
information may be in the form of stored or deleted computer 
files, programs, or e-mails, on the Defendants' computer 
equipment. 
fd. at 651-52. The court then ordered that the computer be imaged. fd. at 653. In 
short, what initially appeared to be an overbroad preservation obligation was required 
in an actual case shortly thereafter. While the court's holding and the commentator's 
conclusions are not necessarily inconsistent, they illustrate the difficulty that 
preserving litigants and counsel face in predicting the scope of the duty to preserve 
information. 
51. Hodgman, supra note 17, at 281. It has recently been noted that: "Given the 
inconsistent case law and local rules, companies must approach the issue of 
preserving electronic data on a case-by-case basis." Jeffrey S. Follett, Hold 
Everything? Litigation Response in the Electronic Age, in ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY 
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including the dynamic, often ephemeral nature of some ESI.52 For 
example, Sedona Guideline No. 7 provides: "In determining the 
scope of information that should be preserved, the nature of the issues 
raised in the matter, experience in similar circumstances and the 
amount in controversy are factors that may be considered. ,,53 
The scope of the duty to preserve information was described in 
Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake V),54 where the court 
noted: "[A] party and her counsel must make certain that all sources 
of potentially relevant informatione5] are identified and placed 'on 
hold,' to the extent required in Zubulake IV.,,56 In Zubulake IV, the 
court held: 
At the same time, anyone who anticipates being a party or 
is a party to a lawsuit must not destroy unique, relevant 
evidence that might be useful to an adversary. "While a 
litigant is under no duty to keep or retain every document in 
its possession. .. it is under a duty to preserve what it 
knows, or reasonably should know, is relevant in the action, 
is reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery57 of 
AND RETENTION GUIDANCE FOR CORPORATE COUNSEL 2006237,249 (PU Litig. & 
Admin. Practice, Course Handbook Series No. 9006, 2006), WL 747 PLIILit 237. 
The Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 37(f) state that the duty to preserve "depends 
on the circumstances of each case." FED. R. CIv. P. 37(e) and accompanying 
advisory committee's note to the 2006 amendments. See supra note 25. 
52. See Conor R. Crowley, A Shifting View of Preservation: How Ephemeral Are 
Current Views on Shifting the Costs of Preservation, Digital Discovery & E-Evidence 
Rep. (BNA) 1,2-4 (Jan. 1,2008) .. 
53. LEGAL HOLDS, supra note 17, at 3. The duty to preserve extends only to "unique" 
information. Id. at 12. It is, however, difficult to determine what information is 
"unique" prior to preserving it for examination. 
54. 229 F.R.D. 422 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
55. On occasion, the duty is described as a duty to preserve relevant "evidence." China 
Ocean Shipping Group v. Simone Metals Inc., No. 97 C 2694, 1999 WL 966443, at 
*3 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 30, 1999). The Zubulake IV court, however, described the duty in 
terms of "relevant information," 220 F.R.D. at 218, and the Sedona Conference 
stated: "[I]t is important to recognize that the duty to preserve extends only to 
relevant information." LEGAL HOLDS, supra note 1 7, at 11. The word "information" 
may lead to different conclusions than the word "evidence," and the former is likely 
the more accurate term. See FED. R. Crv. P. 26(b)(I) ("Relevant information need not 
be admissible at the trial if the discovery appears reasonably calculated to lead to the 
discovery of admissible evidence."). Thus, the Sedona Conference stated, "[T]he 
[preserving] organization should identify what information should be preserved." 
LEGAL HOLDS, supra note 17, at 12 (emphasis added). 
56. Id. at 432. 
57. The scope of discovery is set forth in FED. R. Crv. P. 26(b)(1) ("Parties may obtain 
discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or 
defense-including the existence, description, nature, custody, condition, and 
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admissible evidence, is reasonably likely to be requested 
during discovery and/or is the subject of a pending 
discovery request.,,58 
Similarly, in In re Napster, Inc. Copyright Litigation,59 the district 
court ruled that the duty encompassed all material that the pa~ 
"knows or reasonably should know is relevant to the action." 0 
Descriptions of the scope of the common-law duty to preserve are 
virtually coextensive with the scope of discovery.61 For example, one 
location of any documents or other tangible things and the identity and location of 
persons who know of any discoverable matter. For good cause, the court may order 
discovery of any matter relevant to the subject matter involved in the action. 
Relevant information need not be admissible at the trial if the discovery appears 
reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. All discovery 
is subject to the limitations imposed by Rule 26(b)(2)(C).") Rule 26(b)(I) sets a 
minimal threshold for discovery. Thompson v. U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., 
219 F.R.D. 93,97 (D. Md. 2003). 
Special circumstances may provide justification for narrowing the amount of 
discovery. See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1966-67 (2007) 
(considering cost of discovery in antitrust action); Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court for 
D.C., 542 U.S. 385, 388 (2004) (holding that respect for the Executive Office 
informs the "entire proceeding"); Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 707 (1997); Hoffman 
LaRoche, Inc. v. Sperling, 493 U.S. 165, 179 (1989) (citing FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)); 
Oppenheimer Fund Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 351-52 (1978). 
58. Zubulake IV, 220 F.R.D. at 217 (emphasis added) (citing Turner v. Hudson Trans. 
Lines, Inc., 142 F.R.D. 68, 72 (S.D.N.Y. 1991)). 
59. 462 F. Supp. 2d 1060, 1067 (N.D. Cal. 2006), rev'd, 479 F.3d 1078 (9th Cir. 2007), 
vacated, Nos. C-MDL-00-1369(MHP), C-04-1l66 (MHP), 2007 WL 844551 (N.D. 
Cal. Mar. 20, 2007). 
60. Id.; accord Thompson, 219 F.R.D. at 100 (quoting Zubulake IV, 220 F.R.D. at 216 
(noting that a litigation hold applies to "relevant" documents)). 
6l. Hynix Semiconductor, Inc. v. Rambus, Inc., No. C-00-20905 RMW, 2006 WL 
565893, at *27 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 5, 2006) (finding that duty does not extend beyond 
what is relevant and material); Broccoli v. Echostar Commc'ns Corp., 229 F.R.D. 
506, 510 (D. Md. 2005) ("The duty to preserve encompasses any documents or 
tangible items authored or made by individuals likely to have discoverable 
information that the disclosing party may use to support its claims or defenses." 
(citing Zubulake IV, 220 F.R.D. at 217-18)); China Ocean Shipping Group v. Simone 
Metals Inc., No. 97 C 2694, 1999 WL 966443, at *3 (N.D. 111. Sept. 30, 1999) 
(holding there is a duty to preserve relevant evidence); Goss, supra note 27, at 818 
("Generally, a party is bound to preserve all information that one might reasonably 
anticipate to be discoverable in an action."); Hodgman, supra note 1717, at 268 
(noting that if a party had notice of relevance of information, it had a duty to preserve 
it). See Larson v. Bank One Corp., No. 00 C 2100, 2005 WL 4652509, at *10 (N.D. 
Ill. Aug. 18, 2005) ("Under the Federal Rules, parties to any litigation have the duty 
to preserve documents commensurate with the scope of discovery allowed under 
Fed.R.Civ.P. 26." (footnote omitted)); Danis v. USN Commc'ns, Inc., No. 98 C 
7482,2000 WL 1694325, at *32 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 23, 2000) ("The scope of the duty to 
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commentator asked: "What [m]ust [b]e [r]etained and [p]reserved? 
The simple answer is potentially relevant evidence. This includes 
any evidence that could be helpful in proving or disproving a claim or 
defense.,,62 In short, the link between the scope of the duty to 
preserve and the scope of discovery is clear: "Preservation duties do 
not exist in the abstract, but to serve a purpose: that iS
6 
to ensure that 
discoverable documents are available to be produced." 3 
Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, however, the scope of 
discovery cannot be definitively ascertained before suit is 
commenced. For example, although the December 2007 amendments 
limit discovery to matters related to the parties' "claims or defenses," 
the court has discretion to expand discovery to all facts related to the 
"subject matter involved in the action.,,64 Counsel faced with 
determining the scope of the pre-litigation duty to preserve cannot 
know which discovery standard will subsequently apply. While 
prudence may suggest application of the broader standard, doing so 
may unnecessarily increase the cost of preservation of ESI. 
Even if the governing standard was fixed, the volume and 
complexity of discovery disputes presented to courts for resolution65 
preserve is a broad one, commensurate with the breadth of discovery pennissible 
under Fed.R.Civ.P. 26."); Wm. T. Thompson Co. v. General Nutrition Corp., 593 F. 
Supp. 1443, 1455 (C.D. Cal. 1984) (stating that a duty includes what "is reasonably 
likely to be requested during discovery .... "); Cendali et aI., supra note 28, at 115; 
Crist, supra note I, at 19 ("The scope of the duty to preserve within the context of 
civil litigation is framed by the relevance provisions within the Federal Rules of 
Evidence and the discovery provisions within the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure."); Alan M. Anderson, Issuing and Managing Litigation Hold-Notices, 64 
BENCH & BAR OF MINN. 20, 20 (2007), available at 
http://www2.rnnbar.org/benchandbar/2007/aug07/litigation_held.htm (stating that an 
entity "is under a duty to preserve what it knows, or reasonably should know, is 
relevant in the action, is reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible 
evidence, is reasonably likely to be requested during discovery and/or is the subject 
of a pending discovery request"). 
62. RICE, supra note 27, at 66. 
63. Danis, 2000 WL 1694325, at *33. 
64. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1). 
65. In one study analyzing the discovery process, forty percent of attorneys surveyed 
"reported unnecessary discovery expenses due to discovery problems." Thomas E. 
Willging et aI., An Empirical Study of Discovery and Disclosure Practice Under the 
1993 Federal Rule Amendments, 39 B.C. L. REv. 525, 532 (1998). The complexity is 
demonstrated by Smith v. Cafe Asia, 246 F.R.D. 19 (D.D.C. 2007), where the court 
was faced with a motion to compel production of images stored on a cell phone. The 
court noted: "As such, the question of discoverability is inseparable from 
admissibility, and a detennination is necessary of whether, under Federal Rules of 
Evidence 403 and 412(b)(2), the probative value of the images substantially 
outweighs their prejudice." 1d. at 20. Because the duty to preserve is coextensive 
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demonstrates that its application to specific factual situations remains 
open to debate. In order to comply with the pre-litigation duty to 
preserve, a litigant must predict what will be discoverable before 
receiving a lawsuit or discovery request. 
IV. THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE DO NOT 
APPLY BEFORE AN ACTION IS COMMENCED BY THE 
FILING OF A COMPLAINT; HOWEVER, THE DUTY TO 
PRESERVE MAY ARISE BEFORE A COMPLAINT IS FILED 
The duty to preserve may arise long before litigation commences, 
and continues throughout the course of litigation. If the duty is 
breached after the commencement of a lawsuit, that breach, and any 
applicable sanction, will be governed by the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure.66 A more difficult issue arises when the duty to preserve 
is violated before a lawsuit is commenced by the filing of a 
I · 67 comp amt. 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 1 provides: "These rules govern 
the procedure in the United States district courts in all suits of a civil 
nature whether cognizable as cases at law or in equity or in admiralty, 
with the exceptions stated in Rule 81.,,68 It is immediately apparent 
that the Rules apply "in" the courts, not to matters that predate 
initiation oflitigation.69 
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are promulgated under the 
Rules Enabling Act. 70 That statute provides that: "The Supreme 
Court shall have the power to prescribe general rules of practice and 
procedure and rules of evidence for cases in the United States district 
courts (including ~roceedings before magistrate judges thereof) and 
courts of appeals.,,71 It states that the rules may not abridge, enlarge, 
or modify any substantive right. 72 Again, the statute provides that 
with discoverability, this decision illustrates the difficulty in determining what needs 
to be preserved. 
66. See, e.g., FED. R. CIY. P. 3, 37(e). 
67. See FED. R. CIY. P. 3 (stating that an action is commenced by the filing of a 
complaint). 
68. FED. R. CIY. P. 1. 
69. See generally 4 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE 
AND PROCEDURE § 1012 (2002) ("[T]he language of Rule 1 limits the applicability of 
the federal rules to the United States district courts .... "); PAUL w. GRIMM & 
MICHAEL BERMAN, MARYLAND'S DISCOVERY PROTOCOL 4 (LexisNexis 2007). 
70. 28 U.S.c. § 2072 (2000). 
71. Jd. § 2072(a). 
72. Jd. § 2072(b). In the September 2005 Report of the Standing Committee of the 
Judicial Conference recommending adoption of the 2006 amendments, the drafters 
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Rules may be prescribed "for cases in" court, and not prior to the 
commencement of cases. 73 A lawsuit or action is commenced when a 
complaint is filed. 74 
It is well-accepted that the Federal Rules do not directly govern 
pre-litigation conduct. For example, in connection with the sanctions 
rule: "Rule 37 does not, by its terms, address sanctions for 
destruction of evidence prior to the initiation of a lawsuit or 
discovery requests.,,75 This limitation was likely a jurisdictional 
constraint imposed on the drafters: "The Advisory Committee on 
Civil Rules debated whether it could specify preservation obligations 
in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure but ultimately decided it 
could not do SO.,,76 In fact, "[a] major criticism of Rule 37(f) [now, 
Rule 37(e)] is that it addresses only sanctions under the federal rules, 
which generally do not apply prior to commencement oflitigation.,,77 
A similar conclusion should be reached in connection with Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(2)(C). The entire structure of that Rule 
is directed toward events occurring during litigation. For example, 
the title of Rule 26 is "General Provisions Governing Discovery; 
Duty of Disclosure.,,78 Rule 26(b) is captioned "Discovery Scope 
and Limits.,,79 Also, Rule 26(b)(2)(C) addresses the "frequency or 
extent of discovery otherwise allowed by these rules."so The term 
"discovery" refers to a process that begins, at the earliest, with the 
wrote that preservation obligations are dependent upon the "substantive law of each 
jurisdiction." See JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMMITTEE, supra note 36, at Rule-Page 34 
(emphasis added). Courts sitting in diversity have held that the duty to preserve is 
"substantive," not "procedural." See, e.g., Thomas v. Bombardier-Rotax, 869 F. 
Supp. 551, 553 (N.D. Ill. 1994); State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Frigidaire, 146 F.R.D. 
160, 163 (N.D. Ill. 1992). If the duty to preserve is substantive, the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure may not abridge, enlarge, or modify it. See § 2072(b). 
73. § 2072(a). 
74. FED. R. Crv. P. 3. 
75. Capellupo v. FMC Corp., 126 F.R.D. 545, 550-51 (D. Minn. 1989) (citing EEOC v. 
Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 690 F. Supp. 995,997-98 (M.D. Fla. 1988) (emphasis 
omitted)); ABC Home Health Servs., Inc. v. Int'I Bus. Machs., 158 F.R.D. 180, 182 
(S.D. Ga. 1994) ("Rule 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes a court 
to impose sanctions for discovery abuses. In this case, Rule 37 does not directly 
apply because the alleged destruction of documents took place before the action was 
filed and before discovery began." (citation omitted) (emphasis omitted)); see 
Hodgman, supra note 17, at 261. 
76. LEGAL HOLDS, supra note 17, at 5 n.l3. 
77. Allman, supra note 26, at ~ 43. It should be noted that criticism cannot be directed at 
the drafters of the Rule, because the drafters were limited by the Rules Enabling Act. 
Id. ~ 45. 
78. FED. R. CIV. P. 26. 
79. Id. 
80. Id. 
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filing of a complaint.81 By its express terms, Rule 26(b)(2)(C) 
applies only after a lawsuit is commenced.82 
The duty to preserve may, and often does, arise before 
commencement of a case, because litigation is often "reasonably 
anticipated" before it occurs.83 In that event, neither the cost-benefit 
protections of Rule 26(b)(2)(C) nor the "safe harbor" of Rule 37(e) 
directly apply to the person or entity that is attempting to comply 
with its preservation obligation, even though that obligation may be 
defined by the scope of discovery that will apply the moment after 
litigation is commenced, and even though those Rules will apply after 
litigation is commenced in federal courts. 
The pre-litigation implications are clear. A person or entity faced 
with a duty to preserve prior to litigation must preserve potentially 
relevant information. If ESI is destroyed by the routine, good-faith 
operation of a computer system prior to litigation, the preserving 
party cannot ascertain whether or not it is protected from sanctions. 
V. COURTS MAY EVALUATE PRESERVATION ACTIONS 
OCCURRING BEFORE LITIGATION IS COMMENCED BY 
USING THEIR INHERENT POWERS, NOT THE FEDERAL 
RULES, AND, IN SO DOING, THEY SHOULD RECOGNIZE 
LIMITATIONS ON THE SCOPE OF THE DUTY TO 
PRESERVE BY ANALOGY TO FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL 
PROCEDURE 26(b)(2)(C) AND 37(e) 
A. When Courts Evaluate Pre-Litigation Preservation Decisions, 
They Do So Under Their Inherent Power 
If Rule 26(b)(2)(C)'s cost-benefit protections and Rule 37(e)'s 
"safe harbor" are to be applied to pre-litigation events, it is necessary 
to examine the source of a federal court's power to exercise 
jurisdiction over events that occurred before the action was filed. 
The Supreme Court has recognized that courts have inherent power to 
reach some pre-litigation activity.84 That power, although broad, is 
not unlimited.85 
81. See B & C Tire Co. v. IRS, 376 F. Supp. 708, 712, 714 (N.D. Ala. 1978) (stating 
general rule; yet, noting exception for discovery to perpetuate evidence); In re Royal 
Bank of Can., 33 F.R.D. 296, 299, 302 (S.D.N.Y. 1963). 
82. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(C) (listing aspects of the discovery process and/or 
discovery request that the court shall consider in relation to the facts of a particular 
case to determine whether to limit the scope of discovery). 
83. LEGAL HOLDS, supra note 17, at 5. 
84. E.g., Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 764-67, (1980); Link v. Wabash 
R.R Co., 370 U.S. 626,631-32 (1962); Gumbel v. Pitkin, 124 U.S. 131, 146-47 
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These principles are applicable to the sanctions rule. In the general 
Rule 37 context, courts have squarely held that, although the Rule 
does not directly apply to pre-litigation conduct, it may be applied by 
analogy. For example, it has recently been noted that: 
Several courts have held that Rule 37 sanctions are 
available even where evidence is destroyed before the 
issuance of a discovery request, with a few going so far as to 
apply the rule to conduct that occurred before the lawsuit 
was filed, provided the party was on notice of a claim. But, 
the majority view-and the one most easily reconciled with 
the terms of the rule-is that Rule 37 is narrower in scope 
and does not apply before the discovery regime is 
triggered.86 
Capellupo v. FMC Corp.87 is representative of the majority view. 
Rule 37, Fed.R.Civ.P., is applicable to the "normal" 
disputes, delays, or difficulties occurring in civil litigation. 
Its sanctions are appropriate in instances of a litigant's 
failure to make or cooperate in discovery. Rule 37 enables a 
court to punish the litigant who has not responded 
adequately to discovery requests of an opposing party or to 
orders of the court compelling discovery. Rule 37 does not, 
(1888); Allman, supra note 26, at ~ 44 ("Courts often cite their inherent powers to 
sanction when it is unclear that rule-based sanction authority exists."). 
85. Chambers v. NASCa, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 43-46 (1991) ("It has long been understood 
that '[c]ertain implied powers must necessarily result to our Courts of justice from 
the nature of their institution,' powers 'which cannot be dispensed with in a Court, 
because they are necessary to the exercise of all others.' These powers are' governed 
not by rule or statute but by the control necessarily vested in courts to manage their 
own affairs so as to achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases.' ... 
Because of their very potency, inherent powers must be exercised with rcstraint and 
discretion. A primary aspect of that discretion is the ability to fashion an appropriate 
sanction for conduct which abuses the judicial process. . . . [T]he inherent power 
extends to a full range of litigation abuses. At the very least, the inherent power must 
continue to exist to fill in the interstices." (citations omitted)); cf Societe 
Internationale Pour Participations Industrielles et Cornmerciales, S.A. v. Rogers, 357 
U.S. 197,207 (1958) (noting that Rule 37 is the sole source of sanctions in discovery 
disputes). 
86. United Med. Supply Co. v. United States, 77 Fed. Cl. 257, 268 (2007) (footnote 
omitted). 
87. 126 F.R.D. 545 (D. Minn. 1989). 
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by its tenns, address sanctions for destruction of evidence 
prior to the initiation of a lawsuit or discovery requests.88 
401 
Courts like Capel/upo have, however, looked to Rule 37 to guide 
their exercise of their inherent powers.89 
Thus, even though Rule 37 is not directly applicable to pre-
litigation conduct, when sanctions are imposed, Rule 37 may guide 
the court's discretion: 
Prior to the selection of sanction, if any, the Court notes 
the source of its authority. Defendant challenges the Court's 
power to impose sanctions pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 37. 
EEOC agrees that Rule 37 does not directly apply, but 
insists that the rule is a guide for the exercise of the Court's 
inherent authority to deal with discovery abuses. The Court 
agrees with EEOC's analysis. Conduct of the kind which 
ordinarily would be sanctionable under Rule 37, but falls 
outside the express tenns of the rule, can be sanctioned by 
proper exercise of this Court's inherent powers. Although 
Rule 37 does not apply by its tenns, the Court looks to that 
rule as a guide to detennine the proper level of response to 
defendant's offense. This reliance on the principles of Rule 
37 is particularly appropriate in the light of the conduct at 
issue. Defendant destroyed records for which it was on 
notice that it had a legal duty to preserve, and that duty is 
imposed, in part, to ensure that those records are available 
for litigation of a discrimination charge. Rule 37 deals with 
similar conduct when the legal duty to preserve evidence is 
imposed in the course of a lawsuit. The present case 
logically extends Rule 37 principles to the situation in which 
the legal duty to preserve evidence arises by force of 
administrative regulation prior to the commencement of a 
lawsuit. Two of the policies underlying Rule 37-the 
elimination of profit from failure to comply with the legal 
duty to preserve evidence and the general deterrent effect 
that sanctions for an offense will have on the instant case 
and on other litigation-particularly justify the Court's 
88. /d. at 551 n.14 (citing EEOC v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 690 F. Supp. 995, 997-
98 (M.D. Fla. 1988)). 
89. See State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Frigidaire, 146 F.R.D. 160, 163 (N.D. Ill. 1997); 
Hodgman, supra note 17, at 266; cf Weaver v. ZeniMax Media, Inc., 175 Md. App. 
16, 28-31, 923 A.2d \032, \039-41, 1047 (2007) (prior to litigation, employee 
improperly obtained email from employer; trial court "has inherent authority to 
sanction conduct that occurred prior to the commencement of the litigation" (citing 
Klupt v. Krongard, 126 Md. App. 179, 728 A.2d 727 (1999))). 
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decision to extend Rule 37 principles to the present case. 
Encouraging compliance with the administratively imposed 
duty to preserve evidence in pending discrimination 
complaints shares these common goals with Rule 37 and 
therefore the Court should exercise its inherent powers to 
reach the case in which evidence is destroyed prior to trial in 
violation of 29 C.F.R. § 1602.14.90 
In short, courts have used their inherent powers to reach pre-
litigation conduct and have informed their use of those powers by 
looking to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for guidance. There 
is no reason why courts could not do the same with the cost-benefit 
provisions of Rule 26(b)(2)(C) and the "safe harbor" of Rule 37(e). 
B. Courts Should Use Analogous Provisions of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure to Guide the Exercise of Their Inherent Powers 
to Evaluate Pre-Litigation Preservation Decisions 
At present, there is no assurance91 that the pre-litigation common-
law preservation standard is the same as the parallel discovery 
standard containing the added cost-benefit protections of Rule 
26(b)(2)(C) and the "safe harbor" of Rule 37(e). If the common-law 
preservation standard were to differ from the litigation standard of 
Rule 37(e), anomalous results might occur. The absence of clear 
proportionality guidelines may permit coercive demands and 
settlements. This risk applies to both plaintiffs and defendants.92 
90. Jacksonville Shipyards, 690 F. Supp. at 997-98 (citations omitted). In short, the 
result should be identical regardless of whether conduct occurred before or during 
litigation. See Danis v. USN Commc'ns, Inc., No. 98 C 7482, 2000 WL 1694325, at 
*30 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 23, 2000) ("Whether proceeding under Rule 37 of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure or under a court's inherent powers, the 'analysis is 
essentially the same.'" (quoting Cobell v. Babbit, 37 F. Supp. 2d 6, 18 (D.D.C. 
1999)) (citing Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando Chern. Indus., Ltd., 167 F.R.D. 90, 107 (D. 
Colo. 1996))); accord Larson v. Bank One Corp., No. 00 C 2100, 2005 WL 4652509, 
at *8 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 18,2005) ("[U]nder either Rule 37 or under the Court's inherent 
authority, the analysis for imposing sanctions is essentially the same."). 
91. As recently as the fall of 2006, a leading commentator noted only that it was 
"unlikely" that courts would "invoke their inherent power in order to reach a 
different result on the same facts as would exist under Rule [37(e)]." Allman, supra 
note 26, at ~ 45. Mr. Allman correctly suggests that, "the natural tendency of most 
courts will be to use Rule [37(e)] as a 'guidepost' or reference point in exercising 
their inherent powers." ld. In view of the serious sanctions that may be imposed for 
breaching the duty to preserve, potential litigants need greater certainty. 
92. The duty to preserve applies to plaintiffs. See. e.g., Silvestri v. Gen. Motors Corp., 
271 F.3d 583, 592 (4th Cir. 2001); see also, LEGAL HOLDS, supra note 17, at 1 ("This 
duty [to preserve] arises ... whether the organization is the initiator or the target of 
litigation. "). 
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Given the multiple uncertainties surrounding the duty to preserve, a 
potential civil litigant must guess93 at the scope of the pre-litigation 
duty to preserve: "Not until after a court rules on the need to search 
and produce from the source, can or will, a party know if its initial 
preservation decisions were correct. ,,94 It has recently been noted 
that "[a] producing party can face a Hobson's choice between the 
burden and cost of preservation and the risk of sanctions for failing to 
do SO.,,95 The party will not know if it made the correct choice until 
months later, when a court decides the issue. 
That situation, however, is not consistent with the philosophy 
behind the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.96 In 1938, amendments 
to those Rules introduced the concepts of interrogatories and 
document requests to federal civil litigation.97 From this modest 
start, the scope of discovery expanded to encompass the virtually 
open-ended discovery of all facts related to the "subject matter" of 
the litigation. In the 1990s, studies demonstrated that the costs 
attendant with such a standard had become prohibitive,98 and the 
93. "The ultimate protection for a party whose 'guess' turns out to be wrong is that the 
decisions were reasonable, made in good faith, and not intended to obstruct or 
prevent the discovery of relevant information." See Allman, supra note 36, at 'Il 26 
n.SO. 
94. 1d.'Il25. 
95. THE SEDONA CONFERENCE DRAFT WORKING GROUP I COMMENTARY ON PRESERVING 
AND MANAGING INFORMATION THAT IS NOT REASONABLY ACCESSIBLE 3 n.7 (drft. ed. 
200S) (Draft cited with the permission of The Sedona Conference®. Working Group 
Commentaries are not publicly available until adopted by consensus and published 
on The Sedona Conference® web site, http://thesedonaconference.org; until then, the 
text is subject to change. Publication of this commentary is anticipated in the 
summer of 200S.) (unpublished commentary, on file with author) [hereinafter 
PRESERVING AND MANAGING INFORMATION]. 
96. FED. R. CIV. P. 1 provides: "[These rules] shall be construed and administered to 
secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and 
proceeding. " 
97. For a discussion of the history of changes to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, see 
generally Joseph Gallagher, E-Ethics: The Ethical Dimension of the Electronic 
Discovery Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 20 GEO. J. LEGAL 
ETHICS 613, 613; Hodgman, supra note 17, at 263-65; Marcus, supra note 50, at 
255-57, 2S0 (noting that discovery rules have been amended more than other rules); 
Marcus, supra note 9, at 1-6; Redish, supra note 5, at 563. 
9S. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) advisory committee's note to the 2000 amendments; see, 
e.g., ACF Indus., Inc. v. EEOC, 439 U.S. 1081, IOS6 (1979) ("The extent of this 
[discovery] abuse has been of increasing concern. It was the subject of close 
attention at the Pound Conference held in St. Paul, Minn., in April 1976, and it was 
scrutinized further by the Pound Conference Follow-Up Task Force. The Task 
Force, chaired by then Judge Griffin B. Bell, recommended that the appropriate 
organizations of the bench and bar should 'accord a high priority to the problem of 
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2000 amendments to the Federal Rules scaled back the sC0J'e to 
discovery pertaining to the claims and defenses in the action,9 with 
judges being directed to take an active role in supervising the 
discovery process.100 One purpose of the 2000 amendments was to 
emphasize the need for active judicial intervention to ensure the 
proportionality of discovery through Rule 26(b )(2).101 
Then, in December 2006, new Federal Rules regarding ESI went 
into effect. 102 There is no indication that the 2006 amendments were 
designed to undercut the philosophy behind the 2000 amendments. If 
the duty to preserve is coextensive with the party's discovery 
obligations, then it is logical to assert that the prudential limitations 
on discovery should be engrafted by analogy on the pre-litigation 
duty to preserve. 
Th . 1 h' 103 h . l' 104 ere IS amp e aut onty t at supports a proportlOna Ity 
analysis in the context of the duty to preserve, but none has been 
found applying the cost-benefit limitations of Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 26(b)(2)(C)105 or the "safe harbor" of Rule 37(e)106 by 
abuses in the use of pretrial procedures ... with a view to appropriate action by state 
and federal courts.'" (footnotes omitted». 
99. The Rules confer discretion to permit "subject matter" discovery. See FED. R. CIv. P. 
26(b)(I) ("For good cause, the court may order discovery of any matter relevant to 
the subject matter involved in the action."). 
100. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee's note (b)(I) to the 2000 amendments. 
101. See id. 
102. The Federal Advisory Committee began its work on electronically stored information 
in 1996. Marcus, supra note 9, at 6; see Marcus, supra note 2, at 604. 
103. See, e.g., Allman, supra note 36, at ~ 26 ("However, just as the duty to produce is 
tempered by the principle of proportionality, so should courts take the same approach 
in regard to preservation decisions."); see Wiginton v. Ellis, No. 02 C 6832, 2003 
WL 22439865 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 27, 2003); PAUL & NEARON, supra note 50, at 36 
(describing the standard as one of "reasonableness"); LEGAL HOLDS, supra note 17, at 
2 ("The keys to addressing these issues are reasonableness and good faith."); Goss, 
supra note 27, at 822; see also THE SEDONA CONFERENCE, THE SEDONA PRINCIPLES: 
BEST PRACTICE RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ADDRESSING ELECTRONIC DOCUMENT 
PRODUCTION, 3 (2003), available at http://www.thesedonaconference.org/ 
dltForm?did=SedonaPrinciples200303.pdf ("However, this principle-that storing 
information in an electronic format does not exclude it from the realm of potential 
discovery-does not provide specific guidance on where courts and litigants should 
draw the lines in applying the proportionality test of Rule 26 to electronic discovery 
requests and disputes."). 
104. The principle of proportionality is that the burdens imposed by the duty to preserve 
should be proportionate to what is at stake in the litigation. Proportionality is often 
stated in terms of the duty to preserve being one requiring only "reasonable" efforts. 
See Wiginton, 2003 WL 22439865, at *4. See generally Thompson v. U.S. Dep't of 
Hous. & Urban Dev., 219 F.R.D. 93, 97-99 (D. Md. 2003). 
105. FED. R. Crv. P. 26(b)(2)(C) provides: 
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analogy.107 The current thought process appears to be that potentially 
discoverable information must be preserved, although there is an 
implicit notion that the scope of preservation should somehow be 
proportional to the amount in controversy and the costs and burdens 
of preservation. This article suggests that the best mechanism for 
balancing discoverability and proportionality is the application, by 
analogy, of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 26(b)(2)(C) and 37(e) to 
the pre-litigation duty to preserve. 
The need for guidance is clear. For example, compare the 
principles regarding the duty to preserve backup tapes. It has 
recently been noted that "the parameters of [the duty to preserve'sJ 
application to backup tapes have not yet been fully defined."lo 
On motion or on its own, the court must limit the frequency or 
extent of discovery otherwise allowed by these rules or by local 
rule if it determines that: (i) the discovery sought is unreasonably 
cumulative or duplicative, or can be obtained from some other 
source that is more convenient, less burdensome, or less 
expensive; (ii) the party seeking discovery has had ample 
opportunity to obtain the information by discovery in the action; 
or (iii) the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs 
its likely benefit, considering the needs of the case, the amount in 
controversy, the parties' resources, the importance of the issues at 
stake in the action, and the importance of the discovery in 
resolving the issues. 
Many states have rules similar to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(2)(C). See 
generally Thomas Y. Allman & Ashish S. Prasad, The Forgotten Cousin: State 
Rulemaking and Electronic Discovery, in ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY AND RETENTION 
GUIDANCE FOR CORPORATE COUNSEL 2007 317, 328, 335-38 app. (PU Litig. & 
Admin. Practice, Course Handbook Series No. 11596, 2007) WL 766 PLIILit 317 
(discussing state rules governing ESI). In Maryland, for example, Rule 2-402(b) is 
analogous. See MD. R. 2-402(b). Thus, even where the duty to preserve is governed 
by state law, the principles set out in this article may be applicable. 
106. Rule 37(0 was moved to Rule 37(e) in December 2007, without substantive change. 
The Rule provides: "Absent exceptional circumstances, a court may not impose 
sanctions under these rules on a party for failing to provide electronically store.d 
information lost as a result of the routine, good-faith operation of an electronic 
information system." FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e). 
107. In one decision, Rule [37(e)] was relied upon to excuse a failure to preserve. Allman, 
supra note 26, at ~ 46 & n.ll 0 (citing Convolve, Inc. v. Compaq Computer Corp., 
223 F.R.D. 162, 177 (S.D.N.Y. 2004)). In an as-yet unpublished, April 22, 
2008, draft Commentary, the Sedona Conference suggests applying Rule 
26(b)(2)(C) factors to the pre-litigation duty to preserve. PRESERVING AND 
MANAGING INFORMATION, supra note 95, at 15-16. 
108. Grant J. Esposito & Thomas M. Mueller, Backup Tapes. You Can't Live with Them 
and You Can't Toss Them: Strategies for Dealing with the Litigation Burdens 
Associated with Backup Tapes Under the Amended Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 
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There is "generally" no duty to preserve such tapes; 109 however, if the 
backup tapes pertinent to key players can be identified, there may be 
a duty to preserve them. llo This creates a dilemma for a preserving 
party.111 
Consider also the preserving party's choice-of-Iaw dilemma. Faced 
with reasonably anticipated litigation and a duty to preserve, the 
preserving party's decisions may be governed by the source of the 
duty. If the duty arises under statute, regulation, court order, or 
contract, the source document may define the duty. If the duty arises 
under common-law, the duty may be a state duty for state courts and 
diversity cases, or a federal one for federal-question cases. Where 
federal and supplemental state claims are joined in a single action, I 12 
there could be differing duties. And the consequence of a breach-
13 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 13, ~ 10 (2007), http://law.richmond.eduljoltlv13i3/ 
articleI3.pdf; see also Withers, supra note 14, at 189. "In short, requesting parties 
consider backup tapes to be a wealth of infonnation. Producing parties consider 
them to be the equivalent of a vast waste dump. Thus, not surprisingly, the courts 
have offered inconsistent guidance as to how they will be treated." Bennett, supra 
note 3, at 133; see generally Kenneth J. Withers, Computer-Based Discovery in 
Federal Civil Litigation, 1 FED. CTS. L. REv. 65, 74--75 (2006) (noting unique 
problems presented by backup tapes). 
109. Zubulake lV, 220 F.R.D. 212, 217 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
110. See id. at 217-18; see also Cache La Poudre Feeds, LLC. v. Land O'Lakes, Inc., No. 
04-cv-00329-WYD-CBS, 2007 WL 684001, at *623 n.lO (D. Colo. Mar. 2, 2007); 
Hodgman, supra note 17, at 271 ("Backup tapes probably fall under the litigation 
hold if they are accessible, not obsolete due to technological advances, and currently 
used to retrieve infonnation."); Withers, Computer-Based Discovery, supra note 108, 
at 71 ("In Linnen v. A.H. Robins Co., the defendant faced sanctions in the fonn of 
costs and a spoliation inference stemming from counsel's failure to completely 
investigate stored computer backup tapes, while representing to the court that all 
relevant computer files had been produced." (footnote omitted)). 
Ill. See Follett, supra note 51, at 248-50 ("One can question whether the Zubulake IV 
'exceptions' swallow the rule. For example, backup tapes are always 'accessible' to 
some degree, and companies may use backup tapes (at least recent ones) for non-
emergency document retrieval on occasion. Moreover, it is almost always possible 
for a company to 'identify where particular employee documents are stored on 
backup tapes,' provided it spends enough time and money to restore and search the 
tapes. . .. Recycling of backup tapes poses a trickier issue, [and it] is highly fact-
specific .... "). 
It is important to note that the issue of inaccessible media is currently being 
addressed by the Sedona Conference. The Sedona Conference suggests that 
"[r]egardless of the accessibility of the source of potentially discoverable 
infonnation, if the burdens and costs of preservation are disproportionate to the 
potential value of the infonnation sought, it is reasonable to decline to preserve the 
source." PRESERVING AND MANAGING INFORMATION, supra note 95, at 15. 
112. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (2006); Zubulake lV, 220 F.R.D. at 216 (discussing generally 
the duty to preserve). 
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whether spoliation is a tort or an evidentiary doctrine-may differ 
depending on the forum. Absent clear guidance regarding limits on 
the scope of the duty to preserve, a party engaged in a good-faith 
effort to preserve evidence prior to litigation may wove the military 
maxim that any ship can be a minesweeper-once. I 3 
Cases imposing substantial sanctions, including criminal 
prosecution, adverse inference instructions, restrictions on testimony, 
and monetary penalties, as well as the attendant ethical implications, 
demonstrate that a misstep in determining the scope of the duty may 
have serious consequences. I 14 The serious consequences may compel 
a risk-adverse potential litigant to exercise extraordinary care in 
preserving "everything" at enormous cost and effort, although such 
extraordinary effort is not required by law. lIS Because the duty to 
preserve often arises before a lawsuit is filed, the duty may arise 
during a "free for all" period where there is no judicial umpire, 116 no 
opposing counsel available or willing to negotiate the scope, no clear 
limitation based on practical realities of the business world, and no 
way to determine the applicable source of law, i.e., statutory, 
regulatory, federal, or state, and, if state, which one. While Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 1 calls for the just, speedy, and inexpensive 
resolution of disputes, this lack of guidance suggests that prudent 
counsel and cautious litigants may expend enormous sums to 
preserve ESI that need not be preserved, will never be produced in 
discovery,117 and that may exceed the economic value of the claims 
presented, in contravention of the fundamental principle underlying 
the Federal Rules. 
Consider a hypothetical example. X purchases a used motor 
vehicle from Auto Dealer, Inc., for $5,000. A dispute over the 
vehicle arises and X contends that two salespersons made 
misrepresentations, that Auto Dealer's web site contained false 
statements, and that X saw the salespersons exchanging email or text 
messages during the purchase and sale negotiations. X, acting pro se, 
113. Posting of Brian to http://www.bimmerfest.comlforums/archive/index.php/t-
5351O.html (Feb. 24, 2004, 06:35 EST) (quoting Anonymous). 
114. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.4(a) (2008); PAUL & NEARON, supra 
note 50, at 46 (describing a range of available sanctions). 
115. See, e.g., Zubulake IV, 220 F.R.D. at 217 ("Must a corporation, upon recognizing the 
threat of litigation, preserve every shred of paper, every e-mail or electronic 
document, and every backup tape? The answer is clearly, 'no'."). 
116. See Bennett, supra note 3, at 127 (noting that the preservation obligation occurs 
before there is a chance for a "meet and confer" and before there is "a chance to 
approach the court for a ruling on the reasonableness of the preservation approach"). 
117. See supra note 9. 
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sends a letter to Auto Dealer suggesting that a lawsuit will follow if 
$5,000 is not paid immediately. X, a computer programmer, asks 
that Auto Dealer mirror image the salespersons' computers, PDAs, 
voicemails, cell phones, and network folders. X believes that the 
salespersons communicated electronically with a supervisor, and 
demands preservation and imaging of the unknown supervisor's ESI. 
X demands preservation of all of the vehicle's maintenance records 
and all ESI that refers or relates to Auto Dealer's acquisition of the 
auto. X demands that the current and past web pages be preserved. 
X also seeks preservation of ESI related to the salespersons' 
communications with other purchasers, asserting that the 
misrepresentations were part of a pattern. Finally, X also asks for 
preservation of all of the vehicle's manufacturer's recall ESI received 
by Auto Dealer. In the current marketplace, the cost to Auto Dealer 
of preserving the ESI would be greater than the cost of the claim. 
There is no judge to referee the dispute because suit has not been 
filed. There is no opposing attorney to negotiate with, because X is 
pro se. Because X likely has no ESI to preserve, there is no 
reciprocal interest-known during the Cold War as "mutually assured 
destruction" or the "balance of terror"-on X's part in reducing 
reliance on Auto Dealer's ESI. Absent a principled limit on the 
scope of the duty to preserve, Auto Dealer must either expend more 
than the claim is worth to preserve ESI, or fail to preserve 
discoverable ESI and risk an adverse inference instruction, order 
precluding testimony, default judgment, or monetary sanction. Auto 
Dealer's decision could be made even more complex if X were able 
to assert both federal and state claims, as well as regulatory claims. 
How would the application of Rule 26(b)(2)(C) and 37(e) factors 
assist Auto Dealer? First, Auto Dealer would have a readily available 
source of guidance, the body of case law interpreting Rule 
26(b )(2)(C) and its predecessor. Auto Dealer might assert that it 
would be reasonable to spend a specified number of hours and funds 
performing preservation tasks, and that any additional efforts would 
be undertaken only upon payment by the requesting person. 118 
118. See Marens v. Carrabba's Italian Grill, Inc., 196 F.R.D. 35, 37-38 (D. Md. 2000) 
("[Former] Rule 26(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 26 requires the 
court to balance various factors to determine just how much discovery is reasonable 
in a given case. This analysis is tailored to the particular needs of each case, and 
requires the court to consider both the importance of the discovery sought to the 
moving party, as well as the cost and burden to the producing party. The court is 
given great flexibility to order only that discovery that is reasonable for a case, and to 
adjust the timing of discovery and apportion costs and burdens in a way that is fair 
and reasonable. . .. Rule 26(b )(2) allows the Court to direct alternative methods of 
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Second, if ESI had been lost prior to notice of the claim, due to 
routine operation of the information system, Auto Dealer could seek 
protection under the Rule 3 7 (e) "safe harbor." 119 Third, Auto Dealer 
could note that the extent of use of the discovery methods, including 
coextensive preservation efforts, shall be limited by the court under 
specific circumstances. 120 Auto Dealer might interview its 
employees, review its paper documents and active data, and 
determine that expensive preservation of deleted and fragmented data 
was unnecessary because "the discovery sought is unreasonably 
cumulative or duplicative, or can be obtained from some other source 
that is more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensivet thereby 
obviating a need for some costly electronic preservation. 21 More 
significantly, Auto Dealer would be able to assert that "the burden or 
expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit, 
considering the needs of the case, the amount in controversy, the 
parties' resources, the importance of the issues at stake in the action, 
and the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues.,,122 If 
Auto Dealer could determine that there was no need for metadata or 
deleted data because of the nature of the allegations or the 
information technology, it might be able to decide not to preserve 
some ESI because other data would provide X with "ample 
opportunity to obtain the information by discovery in the action.,,123 
These Rule 26(b)(2)(C) and 37(e) factors provide Auto Dealer with 
substantially more guidance than the bare concept of 
"proportionality" or "reasonableness." If Auto Dealer is subsequently 
faced with a spoliation motion for sanctions, it-and its counsel-
discovery, if they are more reasonable than that chosen by a party, and objected to by 
another. . .. Defendant will produce responsive documents prepared by general 
managers within its Virginia, Washington D.C. and Maryland restaurants for the five 
years preceding the termination of the plaintiffs employment. The search time for 
this information will be included in the 40 hours referred to with respect to request 
no. I, above. If, after review of the additional documents, plaintiff desires further 
discovery, he may file a motion requesting it, and if meritorious, further discovery 
will be allowed, subject to review by the Court to determine whether plaintiff should 
pay all or part of the cost of further discovery." (citations omitted». The textual 
argument is not inconsistent with the presumption that the producing party bear the 
cost of producing active ESI, because it would be made in the pre-litigation context 
of a common-law duty to preserve, not to produce. 
119. See FED. R. CIy. P. 37(e). 
120. FED. R. CIY. P. 26(b)(2)(C). 
121. FED. R. CIy. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(i). 
122. FED. R. CIY. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(iii). 
123. FED. R. CIy. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(ii). 
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will have, at a minimum, detailed standards on which to base their 
arguments. 
To give one other example, assume that a potential litigant has four 
servers and twenty work stations, older legacy computers, plus 
backup tapes. Next, assume that litigation is reasonably anticipated, 
and that it will center on a commercial dispute over contract 
interpretation, with no allegations of fraud or dishonesty. Assume 
that the issue is whether A delivered conforming goods to B. 
Obviously, pertinent commercial documents, such as the orders, 
invoices, and contract should be preserved. The general duty to 
preserve may also include deleted data, data in slack spaces, backup 
tapes, legacy systems, and metadata, related to orders, invoices, 
shipping manifests, the contract, email, and correspondence, although 
there may be no need for this information, and it may be that the 
dispute can be resolved using basic email and word processing 
documents without resorting to more expensive-to-preserve-and-
produce ESI sources. 124 Assume further that the opposing entity 
either refuses to negotiate a reasonable preservation regime or is not 
represented by counsel. Rather than pay tens of thousands of dollars 
to preserve deleted data and metadata, the preserving party could 
decide not to incur the high cost of preserving the data and, if later 
challenged, assert under Rule 26(b )(2)(C)(iii) that "the burden or 
expense of the proposed [preservation] outweighs its likely benefit, 
considering the needs of the case... and the importance of the 
discovery in resolving the issues.,,125 While the preserving party is 
still at risk if it chooses not to preserve the deleted data, absent 
application of Rule 26(b)(2)(C) by analogy, the preserving party 
could assert only a defense of "reasonableness" or 
"proportionality." 126 Application of Rule 26(b)(2)(C) by analogy, 
while it provides imperfect protection, increases the level of 
protection and thereby effectuates the goal of "just, speedy, and 
inexpensive resolution[]" of the forthcoming action. 127 
124. See Mich. First Credit Union v. Cumis Ins. Soc'y, Inc., No. 05-74423, 2007 WL 
4098213, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 16, 2007) (stating that "most" metadata is "of 
limited evidentiary value" (citing Wyeth v. Impax Labs., Inc., No. Civ.A. 06-222-
JJF, 2006 WL 3091331, at *2 (D. Del. Oct. 26, 2006»); see also Williams v. 
SprintlUnited Mgmt. Co., 230 F.R.D. 640, 651 (D. Kan. 2005) (stating "most of the 
metadata has no evidentiary value"). It is likely that the same could be said of much 
deleted data. The need for such data is generally fact-sensitive or case-specific. 
125. FED. R. Crv. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(iii). 
126. See supra note 104 and explanation therein. 
127. 28 U.S.c. § 471 (2006); FED. R. Crv. P. 1. 
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It is recognized that the cost-benefit limits on discovery may be 
amorphous and difficult to apply to pre-litigation preservation 
decisions. Application of those concepts, however, will provide the 
most detailed standard to guide discretion, and may provide 
preserving parties with a good faith defense to spoliation claims, or 
alternatively, may strip them of an unreasonable defense. 
Application of the Rule's principles will permit parties to articulate 
reasoned bases for decisions to limit the scope of their preservation 
obligations or, alternatively, to challenge unreasonabl~ limited efforts 
to preserve ESI. Faced with a spoliation motion, 1 8 for example, 
counsel may persuasively argue that the common-law duty to 
preserve ESI should not be interpreted to mandate that Auto Dealer 
spend $25,000 preserving ESI to defend against a $5,000 claim. 129 
Similarly, faced with a $15 million claim, a preserving party may 
find it difficult to assert that it was not required to expend $100,000 
to preserve ESI. Ifit is correct to state that "[t]he scope of the duty to 
preserve evidence is not boundless,,,13o Rule 26(b)(2)(C) should 
assist in defining the boundary. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The uncertain scope of preservation obligations before litigation is 
filed, coupled with the risk of serious sanctions when relevant ESI is 
not preserved, encourages over-broad pre-litigation preservation 
efforts, resulting in the expenditure of vast sums to preserve ESI that 
need not be preserved. Given that a party is provided far more detail 
concerning the range of potentially discoverable information after 
litigation is commenced, a party's pre-litigation failure to preserve 
should not result in more onerous sanctions than a party's failure to 
preserve post-filing. Although not explicitly relevant pre-litigation, 
application by analogy of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
128. The first element of a spoliation claim is that the allegedly spoliating party breached 
its duty to preserve information. Boyd v. Travelers Ins. Co., 652 N.E.2d 267, 270 
(Ill. 1995). If, under Rule 26(b)(2)(C)'s application by analogy, there was no duty to 
preserve, there has not been spoliation. See Baugher v. Gates Rubber Co., 863 
S.W.2d 905, 911-12 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993) (finding that, if common law elements of 
tort are not met, dismissal is appropriate). 
129. "At some point the adversary system needs to say 'enough is enough' and recognize 
that the costs of seeking every relevant piece of discovery is not reasonable." 
Esposito & Mueller, supra note 108, at ~ 28 n.88 (citing Cognex Corp. v. Electro 
Scientific Indus. Inc., No. Civ.A. 0ICVI0287RCL, 2002 WL 32309413, at "'5 (D. 
Mass. July 2, 2002)) (emphasis in original). 
130. RICE, supra note 27, at 72. The writer made this comment in the context of assessing 
the duration of the duty to preserve. 
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26(b)(2)(C) and 37(e), to the pre-litigation duty to preserve provides 
the best mechanism for defining the limits of the duty to preserve and 
providing litigants with practical guidelines in a perilous area where a 
misstep could have significant ramifications. 
